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Certain restrictions on public funding for assisted reproductive technology 
(ART) are articulated and defended by recourse to a distinction between 
medical infertility and social infertility. We propose that underlying the 
prioritization of medical infertility is a vision of medicine whose proper 
role is to restore but not to improve upon nature. We go on to mark moral 
responses that speak of investments many continue to make in nature as 
properly an object of reverence and gratitude and therein (sometimes) a 
source of moral guidance. We draw on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in 
arguing for the plausibility of an appeal to nature in opposition to the charge 
that it must contain a logical fallacy. We also invite consideration of the 
moral plausibility of some appeal to nature. Finally, we examine what 
follows in the case of ART. Should medicine respect as natural limits that 
should not be overcome: the need for a man and a woman in reproduction; 
menopause; and even declining fertility with age? We must first ask 
ourselves to what degree we should defer to nature in the conduct of 
medicine, at least in the particular if not the general case. This will involve 
also asking ourselves what we think is natural and in what instances and 
spirit might we defy nature. Divergent opinions and policies concerning 
3 
 
who should receive ART treatment and public funding are more easily 






What requests for assisted reproductive technology (ART) are worthy of 
medicine as a vocation and of active support from the public in the form of 
funding?  This question is passionately debated in view of the profundity of 
its stakes.  It is also philosophically complex, this paper demonstrates. 
 
 
IDENTIFYING THE CENTRALITY OF THE ‘MEDICAL’ 
 
Variations in eligibility criteria for ART treatment and funding continue to 
exist both in Australia and internationally.  Barring certain exceptions, 
South Australian and Western Australian legislation require that a person be 
medically infertile in order to qualify for treatment.
1
  By contrast, in 2008 
the Australian State of Victoria amended its legislation: ART is now 
accessible to, among others, any woman who, without it, is unlikely to 
                                                 
1
 South Australia’s ‘infertile’ has been interpreted to mean this while Western Australia 
specifies ‘medical reasons’.  SA, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TREATMENT ACT 1988 




become pregnant, to carry a pregnancy or to give birth.
2
  ART is thereby 
available to menopausal and post-menopausal women and to women 
without a male partner (single women and women in a same-sex 
relationship, for instance).  Technically, however, the treatment still needs to 
be privately funded, as public funding, flowing from the federal and not the 
state government, continues to require the presence of a medical condition.
3
 
In 2006, for instance, a federal government ART Review Committee 
explained that ‘Medicare benefits are not payable to single women or same 
sex couples who access ART treatments unless they are clinically infertile’.4  
The Committee implied that this was non-discriminatory: ‘Reimbursement 
through Medicare is dependent upon the presence of a medical condition 
determining a clinical need and not dependent upon partner status.’5  The 
report did not challenge the prevailing arrangement whereby solely ‘clinical 
need’ warranted public reimbursement.  And it considered it self-evident 
that such need was absent in single women and same-sex couples. 
Such need has also been thought attenuated in the case of older 
women seeking ART.  As part of their rationale for limiting ART public 
funding to women aged 37 and under, the Southern Health Care Region of 
                                                 
2
 Vic, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TREATMENT ACT 2008 (NO. 76 OF 2008) – 
SECT 10(2)(a)(i–ii). 
3
 See Carol Nader. 2007. No Medicare for Lesbians’ IVF. The Age 19 Dec. 
4
 Assisted Reproductive Technologies Review Committee. 2006. Report of the Independent 
Review of Assisted Reproductive Technologies. Australia: Commonwealth Department of 
Health and Ageing: 43. 
5
 Ibid: 52. 
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Sweden cites ‘a normal-deviant scale’.6  This implies that infertility in older 
women represents less of a deviation from the norm than infertility in 
younger women and that, as such, older women have less need for ART.  
This implicitly conceives of medicine as properly limiting itself to the 
correction of (burdensome) deviations from the norm. 
A German survey of over 3000 people representing a range of 
stakeholders found three ‘major normative convictions’ to be ‘statistically 
associated with support for [complete ART] public funding’: (1) ‘Infertility 
is a disease’; (2) ‘Having children is a basic opportunity every human 
should have’; and (3) ‘Infertile couples with an unfulfilled desire for 
children are usually in need of assisted reproduction’.7  Indeed, the authors 
found it ‘interesting’ that: 
 
respondents’ views regarding financing ART associated with 
theoretical assumptions that are also key issues in the philosophical and 
ethical discourse on financing ART, i.e. infertility as disease, having 
children as basic human opportunity and assisted reproduction as a 
medically necessary versus non-necessary treatment.
8
   
 
                                                 
6
 Håkan Lindström & Susanne Waldau. Ethically Acceptable Prioritisation of Childless 
Couples and Treatment Rationing: “Accountability for Reasonableness”. Eur J Obstet 
Gynecol Reprod Biol 2008; 139: 176–186: 182. 
7
 O. Rauprich, E. Berns & J. Vollmann. Who Should Pay for Assisted Reproductive 
Techniques? Answers from Patients, Professionals and the General Public in Germany. 





These three ‘major normative convictions’ can interact in different ways.  Is 
it solely in view of how basic or important is the opportunity of having a 
child that we identify in infertility a disease and/or need for treatment?  (A 
parent’s love and sacrifice amply testify to the importance and potential 
dimensions of that opportunity.)  Do we identify a need for treatment more 
in view of the important opportunity, the disease (qua biological or 
functional abnormality, say) or both?  If solely the important opportunity, 
then medical and social infertility alike necessitate treatment.  Answers to 
the question, then, shape views on who should receive ART. 
Prominent among rationales for ART public funding is the notion 
that ART rightly meets a ‘medical need’.9  But ambiguities exist around the 
meaning of ‘medical need’.  Even those suffering ‘social’ infertility may lay 
claim to a ‘medical need’ precisely to the degree that (1) medical treatment 
can assist them and (2) they testify to a need.   Women without a male 
partner have oft been described as suffering (merely) ‘social’ as opposed to 
(properly) ‘medical’ infertility.  It can be argued that menopausal and post-
menopausal women also suffer infertility of more social than medical origin 
                                                 
9
 Philipa Mladovsky and Corinna Sorenson review observed rationales: ART should be 
publicly funded because: (1) infertility is a disease or medical condition; (2) ART meets a 
‘medical need’; (3) ART fulfils a human right; (4) health inequalities are inequitable; and 
(5) publicly funded ART will increase a country’s Total Fertility Rate and reduce 
population ageing.  In our view, the first four rationales conceptually reduce to questions 
concerning the second, while the fifth, Mladovsky and Sorenson stress, ‘needs to be treated 
with caution, not least because there is very little experience with it and minimal supporting 
evidence’.  Philipa Mladovsky & Corinna Sorenson. Public Financing of IVF: A Review of 
Policy Rationales. Health Care Anal 2010; 18: 113–128. 
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when their fertility has suffered as a result of some deferral of the active 
attempt to conceive that has been more social than medical in nature 
(namely, not attributable to some biological or functional abnormality).  
Some argue that those suffering ‘merely’ social infertility do not represent 
appropriate candidates for ART treatment, while others limit their 





PROPOSING THE CENTRALITY OF THE ‘NATURAL’ TO THE 
‘MEDICAL’ 
 
In the general case, medical need is variously thought to obtain where there 
exist: diseases; symptoms of diseases; discomforts; dysfunctions; 
abnormalities; pathologies; deviations from the typical and predictable; or 
disruptions in normal species function that threaten a fair equality of 
opportunity.
11
  Might ‘nature’ be the elephant in this room?  We might see 
in this catalogue simply paraphrases of, say, ‘problematic deviations or 
                                                 
10
 For relevant discussion see M.M. Peterson. Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Equity 
of Access Issues. J Med Ethics 2005; 31: 280-285; Maurice Rickard. 2001. Is It Medically 
Legitimate to Provide Assisted Reproductive Treatments to Fertile Lesbians and Single Women? 
Australia: The Department of the Parliamentary Library. Available at: 
www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2000-01/01RP23.pdf [Accessed 1 Nov 2010]; J.A. Parks. A 
Closer Look at Reproductive Technology and Postmenopausal Motherhood. CMAJ 1996; 
154(8): 353-355. 
11
 For such a list see Ibid: 117–119 .  The last phrase borrows from Norman Daniels. 1985. 
Just Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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failures in nature’.  That would be one plausible interpretation.  On one 
view, medicine finds its reason for being in addressing these deviations or 
failures.  It restores the proper functioning and being of nature whenever it 
(and especially our own bodily nature) causes us problems sufficiently 
egregious.  Here medicine ought not alter nor seek to improve upon nature, 
at least in its fundamentals (to fix creation, as it were).
12
  We may say that 
nature is here respected, obeyed or deferred to.
13
  This paper increasingly 
explores precisely what ‘nature’ does or might mean and what morally 
normative weight it does or might carry, both in the conduct of medicine 
and more broadly.  An appeal to nature can lie at the heart of some views 
concerning the proper use of ART treatment and funding.  In evaluating 
those views, it is critical to explore how – and how defensibly – an appeal to 
nature might be made. 
In May 2009, the president of the Australian Medical Association 
(AMA), obstetrician Andrew Pesce, asserted that: 
 
Fertility treatment is there to treat diseases that cause infertility, it 
shouldn’t be there as a lifestyle choice…For example, single women 
(who choose IVF) don’t have a disease, they just don’t have a partner.  
                                                 
12
 See Andrew Dutney. 2001. Playing God: Ethics and Faith. East Melbourne, Vic: 
HarperCollinsReligious. 
13
 We do not see that a retreat from the ‘natural’ to the ‘normal’ (or from ‘nature’ to 
‘normal species function’) is much of one at all.  The same connotations or morally 
normative dimensions can exist in both talk of the natural and talk of the normal. 
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Same-sex couples, they don’t have disease [sic] but they are using an 




Pesce later rescinded his comments, describing them as ‘clumsy’.15  They 
had provoked opposition from those who considered them discriminatory 
(while a number of reader comments expressed support for them).  Former 
AMA president Kerryn Phelps pilloried his deference to ‘the natural order 
of things’:  ‘If male/female couples (receiving IVF treatment) followed the 
‘natural order’ of things then they would remain childless’.16  Her 
counterpoint did not directly speak to Pesce’s original emphasis on disease 
as the proper object of medicine.  Rather, it supplanted Pesce’s implied 
vision of and for medicine with another.  For Pesce, we may infer, medicine 
properly opposes nature only when the latter problematically deviates, 
declines or falters, not when we face any need whatsoever.  On such a view, 
medicine seeks to restore nature but not to improve upon it, as it were.  
Medicine does not bend nature to its every will.  The content of that will is 
relevant and important. 
Let us expanding on Phelps’s riposte.  Is it not odd to appeal to 
nature when it comes to medicine, which so often opposes nature ‘taking its 
course’?  And is it not doubly so in an area of medicine that has been 
                                                 
14
 Eleni Hale. 2009. AMA President Dr Andrew Pesce Says Gay People Should Not Have 
IVF. News.com.au 2 Aug. Available at: http://www.news.com.au/ama-president-dr-andrew-








variously dubbed ‘assisted’ and ‘artificial’ reproductive technology?  
Indeed, the distinction between ‘assisted’ and ‘artificial’ is suggestive.  
Medicine may be viewed as essentially in agreement with nature, ‘assisting’ 
it to get back on track, to awaken from dormancy or to realise what is proper 
to it.  Alternatively, medicine may be conceived as essentially opposing 
nature (where desirable) with a power of its own.  Here medicine (as 
‘artifice’ or contrivance, of human origin) may defy nature whenever the 
(higher) service of humankind commends.  This could be called an 
anthropocentric conception of medicine, as opposed to a nature-deferential 
one. 
Marcus Aurelius made a striking observation that we can draw on 
here: 
 
Wherever it is in agreement with nature, the ruling power within us 
takes a flexible approach to circumstances, always adapting itself easily 
to both practicality and the given event.  It has no favoured material for 
its work, but sets out on its objects in a conditional way, turning any 
obstacle into material for its own use.  It is like a fire mastering 
whatever falls into it.  A small flame would be extinguished, but a 
bright fire rapidly claims as its own all that is heaped on it, devours it 




                                                 
17
 Our emphasis.  Marcus Aurelius. 2006. Meditations. Translation and notes by Martin 
Hammond. London: Penguin: 23. 
11 
 
In light of its opening, this observation may accord with Pesce’s implied 
vision for medicine.  However, it may instead lend succour to one closer to 
Phelps’s if we dare to imagine that every attempt to reproduce is in fact ‘in 
agreement with nature’.  Here a single woman and a conventional couple 
employ ART in a manner that equally agrees with nature to the degree that 
they both try to realise something perfectly natural, indeed, we may say, ‘the 
most natural thing in the world’: the call to have, rear and love young. 
 
 
EXPANDING THE PARAMETERS OF THE ‘NATURAL’ 
 
Aurelius articulated a vision of human ingenuity which thrives when in 
agreement with nature.  Differently, Peter Singer and Deane Wells argued 
that all artifice, including medicine, is ‘perfectly natural’ if directed toward 
certain ends: even ‘The father of modern conservatism, Edmund Burke, said 
‘Art is man’s nature’, by which he meant that we were most truly human 
when exercising our specifically human capacities.’18  This view implies 
that humankind can only defy nature by failing to sufficiently exercise those 
capacities (toward certain ends).
19
  We may wish to assert that ingenuity or, 
                                                 
18
 P. Singer & D. Wells. In Vitro Fertilisation: The Major Issues. J Med Ethics 1983; 9: 192–
199: 193. 
19
 Singer would later argue that people fundamentally aim at the satisfaction of their 
preferences.  The views of Aurelius and Singer and Wells are reconcilable if our ends are 
conceived as natural. 
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differently, mercy is deeply natural to humankind.
20
  Under these lights we 
might identify ART as natural. 
Sue is infertile and Mia is her friend.  We could comprehend Sue’s 
interpretation of her infertility as nature telling her that she should not have 
children.  We could equally comprehend Mia, who, like her friend, often 
defers to nature, parting ways on this occasion and imagining Sue gravely 
mistaken.  Mia may come, and invite Sue, to question the normativity, and 
even very idea, of nature.  Alternatively, Mia may hold fast to those and 
seek to convince Sue (1) that ART is natural or (2) to take a leap of faith in 
(seeming or actual) defiance of nature in the name of love or some higher 
service (which may or may not be conceived as natural in a different, 
potentially more ultimate sense). 
Talk of the natural runs the dangerous risk that other people may 
themselves be seen and treated as ‘problematic deviations or failures in 
nature’.  Many have long suffered such ostracism and consequent 
cruelties.
21
  But it is interesting to note that one means of redressing these is 
not altogether to buck nature as a category of any use or authority, but rather 
to defer to it with ever increasing acuity and resolution.  ‘But it feels natural 
to me!’  This protest implies the importance of the ‘natural’ as a category 
                                                 
20
 Alternatively, we may wish to assert that they are more important than regard for 
whatever may be natural. 
21
 Michel Foucault opposed all conceptions of what is natural to human beings (all 
conceptions of human nature) precisely because he took them to ‘straightjacket’.  He took 
them to limit, via universalising norms of  behaviour, the full range and depth of potential 
belonging to human individuality.  For instance, see Christopher Cordner. Foucault and 
Ethical Universality. Inquiry 2004; 47: 580–596. 
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more than it does its dispensability in the light of conflicting views about 
precisely what is natural.  We might seek to reclaim one of nature’s own, as 
it were, and to sustain talk of nature as valuable.  This may be what Mia 
does in (1) (and potentially (2)).  This may largely have been done with 
masturbation, by way of further example.  What was once thought (and by 
some still thought) a ‘cheating of nature’ science now generally considers 
natural or a normal species function.  It has its place in ‘the natural order of 
things’.  Ideas about precisely what is natural have been updated many 
times, but in itself this need not weaken the relevance and potential value of 
the word.  It may instead mark a shift (even progression) in its parameters 
and use.  Does this risk expanding the concept of nature to the point where it 
is no longer useful because a mere proxy for another (the ‘good’, for 




HOW A DEFERENCE TO NATURE MIGHT BE ARTICULATED AND 
DEFENDED 
 
Tom Frame invites our deference to nature in his book, Children on 
Demand: The Ethics of Defying Nature.  The book examines arguments and 
evidence concerning parenting arrangements that differ from the age-old 
tradition of biological mother and father.  (It is in this context that ART 
comes into Frame’s view.)  Frame defends the traditional parenting 
arrangement as both natural and in the best interests of the child.  The 
14 
 
majority of his book appeals to those best interests, but the book ends by 
more explicitly making good on its subtitle: 
 
Nature dictates that a man and a woman are required for procreation 
and this limitation should be acknowledged and respected because, I 
contend, it discloses something of the purposes and providence of 





When it comes to altering the fundamentals of nature – and Frame sees as 
one of them a biological mother and father raising their child – we must 
defer to nature in the absence of certainty (or at least justified confidence).  
Frame places the burden of proof on those whose position runs counter to 
nature, which, he suggests, we are right to take as a general guide, both 
prudentially and morally. 
Frame warns that it can be very dangerous to interfere with – more 
strongly, to defy – the fundamentals of life before they are fully understood.  
In this he is knowingly conservative, in the literal sense.  More than this, 
Frame may be taken to identify a certain authority belonging to the purposes 
and providence that he discerns in nature.  Victor Hugo offered a striking 
expression of awe before nature: 
 
                                                 
22
 Our emphasis.  Tom Frame. 2008. Children on Demand: The Ethics of Defying Nature. 
Sydney: New South: 21. 
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the contemplar falls into unfathomable ecstasies in view of all these 
decompositions of forces resulting in unity.  All works for all. 
Algebra applies to the clouds; the radiance of the star benefits the 
rose; no thinker would dare to say that the perfume of the hawthorn is 
useless to the constellations…Enormous gearing, whose first motor is 




Hugo divined in nature a unity, indeed, a kind of workers’ solidarity.  Such 
reverence as he expressed for it need not depend upon some (logically 
antecedent) recognition (or ascription) of authority.  Rather, it can be (or 
take the form of) just such recognition or ascription.
24
 
As with reverence, so too with gratitude.  Gratitude before nature can 
be precisely the recognition (or ascription) of a certain authority (connected 
to bounty or generosity).  That most basic and universally shared practice 
among mortals may be to find physical sustenance in nature.  Here we find 
the origin of the idea of ‘natural goods’.  Physically we spring from and 
depend upon nature – it is no wonder that we should ever defer to it, in 
gratitude as in reverence.  What is more, nature rarely inspires gratitude and 
                                                 
23
 Victor Hugo. 1994. Les Misérables. Introduction and notes by Roger Clark. 
Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited: vol. 2: 606. 
24
 Following Wittgenstein, Raimond Gaita has argued that remorse need not depend upon 
or merely attend some acknowledgement of wrong-doing: rather, it can be (or take the form 
of) precisely such acknowledgement.  A great deal can be made of the difference between 
acknowledging (or recognising) something and ascribing it, but in this paper we do not 
enter into that difference.  See Raimond Gaita. 2004. Good and Evil: An Absolute 
Conception. 2 edn. Abingdon: Routledge: ch. 4. 
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reverence more than it does at the conception and birth of a child.  In these 
inspirations nature is capable of providing more than simply physical 
sustenance. 
Accusations of the unnatural need not be merely prejudicial, as they 
were implied to be by Pesce’s opponents (at least in that particular case).  
They need not derive merely from what is often reductively mocked as the 
‘yuck’ factor.25  They may also derive from, among other things, the 
reverence and gratitude that the natural world can inspire in us and the 
authority to which we may thereby take ourselves to be answerable.  
Christopher Cordner argues that many of our moral responses and appeals 
make the sense that they do against a more general background in which 
individuals are loved as irreplaceably unique and unconditionally valuable.
26
  
Similarly, we argue that many appeals to defer to nature make the sense that 
they do against a more general background in which a certain authority is 
identified in nature by virtue of its capacity to inspire reverence and 
gratitude. 
Frame’s conservative approach to interfering with any perceived 
fundamentals of nature is shared by many on different fronts.  For example, 
                                                 
25
 For instance, see Daniel Sokol. Sokol implies that all moral intuitions must be externally 
justified, ‘underpinned by solid reasons’.  This is contested by, among others, Raimond 
Gaita and Christopher Cordner.  Daniel Sokol. 2010. What Is Society’s Problem with 
Elderly Mothers? BBC News 26 Jan. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8480641.stm [Accessed 1 Nov 2010]; Ibid; 
Christopher Cordner. 2002. Ethical Encounter: The Depth of Moral Meaning. Houndmills: 
Palgrave. 
26
 Ibid: 1–19. 
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there exists widespread moral opposition to medical efforts to radically 
oppose the natural ageing process, to clone human beings, and to hybridise 
human beings with animals.  We may also note comparable opposition to 
the destruction of elements unique in nature, such as endangered species or 
ecosystems.  Some intrinsic and not merely instrumental value is given to 
belong to the natural in this way.  An authority is identified in it at least to 
the degree that it has some claims – they may not be decisive.  In this paper 
we propose that nature is a very widespread and potentially profound notion 
capable of much more than oppression: it resides deeply and centrally in 
many of our lives and informs many of our moral judgements (not just the 
worst of them).  We argue that appeals to nature, in particular those often 
moderating the provision and public funding of ART, are at the very least 
intelligible and defensible.  They are so partly by reference to a range of 
connected and widely shared responses (reverence and gratitude) and 
analogous judgements (placing moral limitations on medicine). 
These responses and judgements can be part of (and help to 
constitute) entire ways of speaking and valuing.  Appeals to nature can be 
made – and can make the sense that they do – as part of broader ways of 
speaking and valuing that, we think, good faith commends not dismissing 
out of hand.  Again, that is not to say appeals to nature need be decisive, for 
other concerns will compete.  With reference to Wittgenstein we go on to 
explain what we mean by ‘entire ways of speaking and valuing’.  In this we 






APPEALS TO NATURE NEED NOT BE FALLACIOUS 
 
The word ‘natural’ carries connotations as well as denotations.  The very 
concept or, perhaps more accurately, our variegated use of the word has a 
normative – and very often morally normative – dimension ‘built into it’, as 
it were.  Generally, it is considered good for a thing to be natural.  Likewise, 
a good thing is often thought therein to be natural.  Such thinking is 
considered by many to be fallacious, but one of our central aims in this 
paper is to argue that it need not be. 
What is known as ‘the appeal to nature’ may indeed be a formal or 
logical fallacy (specifically a fallacy of relevance) to the degree that the 
natural and the good do not always correlate (that is, they are not perfectly 
synonymous).
27
  What is natural may not always be good, and vice versa.  
(‘Malaria is natural but not good’, ‘artificial pacemakers are good but not 
natural’.)  However, we would argue that the natural and the good can often 
correlate not by force of logic alone but by force of a logic internal to (and 
partly constitutive of) an entire way of speaking and valuing, a certain 
ethical orientation or faith, for instance, with all of its associated 




                                                 
27
 The same charge might conceivably be made against any pair composed out of the 
beautiful, the true, the good, and the healthy. 
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WITTGENSTEIN’S VISION OF CONCEPTS 
 
Wittgenstein famously turned in his thinking upon pondering a man as he 
flicked his fingertips outward from along his throat and chin in a traditional 
gestural insult recognisable to Sicilians.  What ‘object’ in the world 
corresponded to that?  What underlying, universal ‘logical form’ did that 
represent but one local variation?  Increasingly Wittgenstein explored the 
manner in which particular practices (including the use of words and 
gestures), to varying degrees shared across a community, seemed to betoken 
general rules (of the kind ‘this means that’ or ‘this goes with that’).  Those 
rules seemed variously flexible and open-ended like those of improvised 
games or creatively used punctuation.  Practices and oft spontaneous 
responses seemed to reference – even, on some interpretations, spin – webs 
of meaning and value in relation to which community members variously 
lived their lives.  Wittgenstein did not seek to enforce any rules, mind you, 
nor to trap us in webs; that is, on the latter point, he did not dogmatically 
declare, nor logically deduce, that customary, meaningful connections bind 
us as insuperable limits to our experience, knowledge and communication.  
Rather, he sought to free the fly (from the ‘fly-bottle’, if not quite the web).  
That is, he sought to deliver us from unnecessary confusions (in terms of 
which he characterised much of the philosophical work that preceded him).  
In answer to confusions, Wittgenstein went ‘back to the round ground’ of 
our everyday practices and locutions, back to our lives with words, in order 
20 
 
to ‘look and see’ what similarities and differences existed between them.28  
In this he furnished less a positive theory of language and, more generally, 
of meaning than he did a method (and, by personal example, a sensibility): 
pay patient attention to the ways in which the meaning of words appear 
rooted in different everyday uses and other connected practices.  This may 
help you not only clear up confusions, which boil down to confusions about 
what you mean when you say this or that, but also newly enliven you to 
connections and (not simply origins but) conditions of meaning which might 
formerly have evaded you.  There is considerable scope for going ‘back to 
the rough ground’ when it comes to what we can and do mean by ‘natural’ 
and how such meaning figures into our lives. 
 
 
A GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE ‘NATURAL’ IS NOT LOGICALLY 
NECESSARY TO MAKING SOME APPEAL TO WHAT IS NATURAL 
 
We have variously presented and implied particular uses of the word 
‘natural’: ‘we ought not to defy nature’, ‘ART is used by some as an option 
that gets around the natural order of things’.  We have done this not by way 
of building toward a general definition of the ‘natural’ (for use as a premise 
in argumentation) but, indeed, instead of it (as part of an invitation to accept 
the moral and logical plausibility of appeals not to defy nature).  Socratic 
adduction literally ‘brings’ us ‘to or towards’ a general definition by 
                                                 
28
 Ludwig Wittgenstein. 2001. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. 
Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd: §107, §66. 
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examining particular instances of a word’s use then identifying the common 
element.  The common element, when put into words, equates to the general 
definition.
29
  Wittgenstein, by contrast, when examining particular uses of a 
word, came not to assume the existence of a single common element.
30
  
Instead, he observed that some uses share some common elements while 
other uses share different common elements.  Put another way, some uses of 
a word appear to resemble one another, or overlap in meaning, in certain 
ways, while other uses appear to resemble one another, or overlap in 
meaning, in different ways.  In this way Wittgenstein likened the many 
instances of a word’s use to so many fibres of a thread: some fibres overlap 
along one section of the thread while others overlap along a different 
section.  The thread has no core, no single fibre running through its entire 
length: ‘the strength of the thread [and, indeed, its very existence] does not 
reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in 
the overlapping of many fibres’.31  One such fibre is precisely an appeal that 
‘ART is used by some as an option that gets around the natural order of 
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 See Plato. 1969. The Last Days of Socrates. Translated by Hugh Tredennick. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd: 10. 
30
 In other words, he came not to assume that the Sicilian insult mentioned above must 
share some core of meaning with all other such insults. 
31
 Wittgenstein, op. cit. note 27, §67.  To Wittgenstein, such overlapping in meaning 
appeared ongoing and open-ended as we continued to speak and live.  Threads of meaning 
are not static but transforming to varying degrees as we live with language.  To use a 
different simile, Wittgenstein principally likened a word’s different meanings to family 
resemblances.  No one trait appears to be common among all the members of a family: 
certain members share some traits while other members share different traits.  Just as a 
family exhibits different traits, a word exhibits different meanings. 
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things’.  We write ‘appeal’ and not ‘location of a particular instance 
satisfying the conditions of some general definition’.  The appeal itself can 
serve to expand the range of meanings that ‘natural’ can have just as it can 
gain its meaning from less a general (abstracted) definition than the 
overlapping of so many previous and similar uses of the word.  The appeal 
can contribute to an overlap in meaning just as it draws on others: it can add 
to the thread of meaning just as it borrows from it.  On such a 
Wittgensteinian view, the use of a word in a particular context does not 
supply evidence for a general definition of the word’s meaning as much as it 
(along with other uses, practices and responses) co-constitutes that very 
meaning (in the action of ‘overlapping’). 
Particular uses of a word can be absorbed into the meaning of that 
word (contribute to the thread by overlapping) just as the word itself can be 
called upon given a particular meaning (or the overlapping present among a 
cluster of fibres, namely former and similar uses).  In this way there occurs 
an interdependence of the particular and the general (or, more precisely, of 
the particular and other clustered or overlapping particulars).  The particular 
use does not derive its meaning from any general definition of the word ‘out 
there’ but rather in the overlap of countless previous and similar uses, to 
which any particular use might also contribute. 
On the Wittgensteinian view of meaning that we are tracing, 
locutions alone do not overlap in meaning.  Included among the ‘fibres’ are 
all manner of responses, practices, and ways of carrying on with things 
following communication break down or success.  (I can consider and treat 
something as natural without ever using that word.)  Cora Diamond accents 
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not the word but ‘the human commerce with the word…how the commerce 
with the word ‘fear’ [for example] is interwoven with the rest of the lives of 
the people who use the word’.32  With the word ‘lives’ Diamond invites us 
to imagine the fullest range of activities, interests and deemings significant.  
Diamond’s imagery of weaving is apposite to Wittgenstein’s thread simile. 
Such an appeal to nature as issued above may be interwoven with a 
whole way of speaking and valuing (that is, a life).  Any such whole way of 
speaking and valuing will take the form of a kind of open-ended network 
(fabric) of meanings, with its every thread itself a collection of overlapping 
fibres (meaningful instances).  To the degree that any appeal to nature may 
partake of (and partly constitute) such a whole way of speaking and valuing, 
we would argue that it is reductive – and potentially dismissive of people’s 
deepest convictions, orientations and locations of meaning in life – to 
dismiss the potential relevance of the ‘natural’. 
How, then, do we contest the use of any word, or differentiate 
between use and misuse?  We do this partly by reference to consistency with 
other uses (nearby overlapping fibres) but also by the value we discern in 
the entire way of speaking and living of which those uses of the word are a 
part.  How or by what criteria do we discern that value, especially if our 
criteria themselves are subject to just such evaluation?  That is a good 
question, and the degree to which any circularity here is problematic or 
vicious must be examined elsewhere.  For the moment, we are left with a 
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 Our emphasis.  Cora Diamond. 1989. Rules: Looking in the Right Place. In Wittgenstein: 
Attention to Particulars: Essays in Honour of Rush Rhees (1905–1989). D.Z Phillips & 
Peter Winch, eds. Houndmills: Macmillan: 14–15. 
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fundamental contest about what are the best ways of speaking, valuing and, 
more pointedly, of conducting medicine and sharing resources. 
If you do share a background (or participate in a ‘web’) of reverence 
or gratitude before nature, then you will at least find intelligible 
(understandable, comprehensible, defensible, not absurd) someone’s 
morally deferring to nature in some instance.  You will find it intelligible 
that here nature is an appropriate object of reverence, obedience or some 
similar response, even if you yourself do not defer to nature in this instance.  




WHAT DOES SAYING ‘IT’S NATURAL’ ADD TO SAYING ‘IT’S 
GOOD’?  AREN’T THEY PERFECTLY SYNONYMOUS IN ANY 
APPEAL TO NATURE? 
 
Saying ‘it’s dark’ is not perfectly synonymous with saying ‘it’s black’.  
Each can add a kind of elaboration or support to the other (as per 
overlapping fibres).  Saying that something is natural can offer succour and 
support to saying that it is good or okay.  I weep at the death of a loved one.  
‘Weep’, a friend consoles, ‘it’s good, it’s natural’.  I desire a loved one.  
‘Desire me’, they encourage, ‘it’s good, it’s natural’.  That ‘natural’ may 
offer a consolation or encouragement that adds to and extends beyond that 
offered by the ‘good’ (and potentially vice versa).  If it did, would I 
obviously be mistaken?  No, we suggest. 
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In some contexts, the deeper concept or word – that doing the real 
normative work – will be the ‘natural’ more than the ‘good’.  Somebody 
decries cosmetic breast enlargement as ‘unnatural’.  We risk 
mischaracterising their claim by presuming to paraphrase it merely in terms 
of ‘not good’.  Part of the mischaracterisation lies in the risk of losing the 
connection of the claim to others in the claimant’s network of meanings, or 
whole way of speaking and valuing.  We may find it harder to locate or 
comprehend, for instance, their connected or corollary claim that 
therapeutic breast enlargement (post-cancer, say) is ‘good’ insofar as in 
agreement with nature and, at least in intention and spirit, restorative of 
nature.  People may concur with these (moral) judgements without any 
reference to nature.  In contrasting cosmetic with therapeutic breast 
enlargement, one may simply oppose vanity with mercy, for instance, and in 
this one would be making a judgement about the relative value of pursuits.  
But it would be inaccurate to ascribe to this judgement and the one deferring 
to nature a relation of perfect identity or synonymy.  Their accent is 
different and they may well emanate from (and partly constitute) largely 
different ways of speaking and valuing (different ethical orientations, 
different lives).  It is unnecessary and inaccurate to collapse these 
differences. 
A deference to nature, it may be argued, does not ‘require 
justification’ in the same way that a respect for the life of another human 
being does not require justification.  That very respect or deference can 
itself seem to supply the very conditions of moral justification.  Those can 
be altered or opposed, on Wittgenstein’s view, but at the cost of altering or 
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opposing our whole way of speaking and valuing.  Observations such as ‘we 
depend on the natural world but it does not depend on us’ can be 
expressions of a respect for nature as much as they can be ‘justifications’ for 
such respect. 
It was once thought that humankind could morally weave but not 
dye natural materials, for dying would too greatly oppose nature.  Have we 
merely expanded or fully thrown off the moral limits to such 
transformation?  Most would intuit that morally we may dye our hair 
blonde, even blue, but not grow feathers or fur (via gene technology, for 
instance).  A spectrum of moral assent and affront with respect to our 
transformations of nature would seem to persevere.  Is an opposition to 
growing feathers or fur ‘justified’ or will time prove it as disposable as past 
opposition to dyed wool and blue hair?  If all deference to nature is disposed 
of, then at the very least this comes at the cost of a fundamental shift in our 
morality.  (The significance of this marks a further question, answers to 
which will radically differ.) 
The label of unnatural can be unkind and abused: consequences can 
themselves be unnatural in the sense of ‘monstrous’ or ‘excessively cruel or 
wicked’.  Moreover, ‘nature’ is often vague and variable in meaning and 
application across time and space.  Disputes exist over whether a particular 
thing is natural or not.  From this, however, it does not follow that any 
appeal or deference to nature is fundamentally indefensible.  Any appeal or 
deference to nature need not be naïve – of the potential for cruelty and 
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oppression, of the degree to which cultures can shape perceptions, or of the 





WHAT FOLLOWS IN CASES SPECIFIC TO ART? 
 
In debate – over access to treatment and funding, for instance – some 
deference to nature cannot conscionably be dismissed in principle.  It must 
be considered on its merits in the particular case.  Some deference to nature 
may simply give us pause or affect the spirit in which we do choose to defy 
nature, say, in the service of others.  A question for political philosophy also 
arises.  What is the role of the liberal state in enacting (in the form of 
funding arrangements, say) judgements of what is natural? 
Should we respect as natural limits that should not be overcome: the 
need for a man and a woman in reproduction; menopause; and even 
declining fertility with age?  In each case, one judgement must follow 
another of how fundamental to nature is that limit.  That judgement, in turn, 
must follow one of how fundamental to our morality is a deference to nature 
in this particular case.  That judgement, in its turn, must follow as rich and 
rounded as possible an appreciation of the place and importance of the 
natural in our lives.  Where, how, and how deeply is the natural interwoven 
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 Michael Bess expresses basic support for our position when he writes “We need 
to...acknowledge that some distinctions [like ‘x is more natural than y’] will wind up relatively 
straightforward and satisfying, whereas others will leave us with a frown of nervous 
compromise and approximation”.  Michael Bess. Enhanced Humans versus “Normal People”: 
Elusive Definitions. J Med Philos 2010; 35: 641-55: 653. 
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into our lives?  When do we find it morally good to defer to or, by contrast, 
to defy or depart from nature, and why?  Does ingenuity or mercy, more 
than any relation to nature, more deeply define a medicine worthy of the 
name?  Are those things themselves in some sense natural?  As well as 
arguing for the relevance of these questions, we have tried to conduct some 
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